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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 11:54 pm
Time: 11:54 pm
Results for political offenses
3 results foundAuthor: Farmer, Stephen-Lee Title: An Evaluation of Graffiti as a Tool for Conveying Political and Social Messages Summary: This study considers ways in which graffiti is used as a tool to convey political and social messages that might otherwise be marginalized by modern society as well as other uses to which it is put. It does this by examining available literature including that in support of and opposing use of graffiti and by exploring the ways in which technology and the Internet have contributed to graffiti culture. Details: Plymouth, UK: University of Plymouth, School of Computing, Communications & Electronics, 2007, 42p. Source: Internet Source: Year: 2007 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 116687 Keywords: GraffitiPolitical OffensesVandalism |
Author: Financial Action Task Force Title: Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption Summary: This typology originates from a practitioners‘ understanding that the fight against corruption is inextricably intertwined with that against money laundering; that the stolen assets of a corrupt public official are useless unless they are placed, layered, and integrated into the global financial network in a manner that does not raise suspicion. In some ways, a public official (known as a politically exposed person, or ―PEP) who gathers vast sums of money through corrupt means is far more vulnerable than some other criminals. A narcotics trafficker may reliably depend on being able to remain anonymous with his vast amount of money; a public official begins to draw unwanted attention as soon as he is associated with significant sums from unknown sources. Thus, the corrupt PEP‘s vulnerability presents an opportunity for those authorities engaged in both anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) and anti-corruption (AC) enforcement. This typology differs from other such typologies previously produced by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) because it draws from publicly available work undertaken by experts. The body of work the project team analyzed represents deep AML expertise possessed by individuals and organisations around the globe. Indeed, the objective was to understand these works to draw conclusions from them. Broadly stated, the goal was to stand on the shoulders of others in order to better understand corruption, its mechanisms and vulnerabilities, through an AML/CFT lens. Part of the mandate of the Working Group on Typologies (WGTYP) is to identify new threats and vulnerabilities and conduct research on money laundering and terrorist financing methods and techniques. FATF typology reports typically reveal, describe, and explain the nature of ML/TF methods and threats, thus increasing global awareness and opportunities for earlier detection. In light of its mandate, the project team focused only on the methods used to launder the proceeds of corruption. It does not attempt to describe the methods by which bribery and other corruption are effectuated, concealed, or discovered; such a discussion would be outside of the scope of this paper. While there may be no internationally recognised legal definition of corruption, it is most commonly functionally defined as the use of public office for private gain. The United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe Conventions establish the offences for a range of corrupt behaviour. The conventions define international standards on the criminalisation of corruption by prescribing specific offences rather than through a generic definition or offense of corruption. The offenses can range from petty or systemic corruption, in which public officials or employees receive money to perform (or refrain from performing) official acts, to ―grand corruption, in which those at the political, decision-making levels of government use their office to enrich themselves, their families, and their associates. Because of time and resource limitations involved in this project, the project team restricted itself to an analysis of grand corruption. While there is no precise threshold -- by official rank or otherwise -- to distinguish grand from systemic corruption, the positions of the PEPs involved in the cases in our report ranged from senior legislators to governors to prime ministers and presidents. All of the cases examined involved behaviour that would constitute offenses falling under any of the relevant international AC conventions, as well as the generic definition described above. Where possible, the case studies identified the type of corrupt act from which the proceeds had been derived. The types of corruption involved bribe taking and kickbacks, of both foreign and domestic officials, but also embezzlement (in which money rightly belonging to the State was siphoned for personal use through a variety of means), extortion (in which the public official uses the threat of official power to receive money) and self dealing (in which the corrupt PEP has a personal financial interest in acts and decisions he makes in his official capacity). Details: Paris: FATF, 2011. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed August 5, 2011 at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/31/13/48472713.pdf Shelf Number: 122313 Keywords: CorruptionFinancial CrimesMoney LaunderingPolitical OffensesTerrorism |
Author: National Crime Research Centre (Kenya) Title: A Study of Election Crimes and Offences in Kenya Summary: The importance of crime and offence-free elections cannot be overemphasized. This is because such elections are a reflection of the importance of good political leadership and legitimate governance in the overall development of a country. Election crimes and offences in Kenya contravene the Elections Act 2011 in particular and other provisions of the Constitution and contribute to social, political and economic problems in society. The general objective of this study therefore was to establish the nature of election crimes and offences in Kenya on the basis of the 2013 General Elections. Emphasis was on the types and prevalence rates of election crimes and offences; factors contributing to election crimes and offences in Kenya; effects of election crimes and offences; existing election crimes and offences control measures in Kenya and their effectiveness; and challenges faced in the control of election crimes and offences in Kenya. The study was carried out in 20 counties in Kenya. The study was descriptive in nature. The population for the study consisted of adult male and female members of the public who were staying in the selected localities/counties at the time of the study. The study utilized both probability and non-probability sampling techniques. Selection of the study sites employed simple random sampling and purposive sampling. It was assumed that election crimes and offences were likely to occur in any county. Therefore, the counties were selected using simple random sampling of an arbitrary number of 20 of all the 47 counties. Specific sites for the study were selected purposively and these sites were areas surrounding county headquarters. Convenience/accidental and availability sampling was used to obtain the sample of members of public while key informants were selected purposively. Key informants were drawn from institutions which were stakeholders in the criminal justice system, management of elections, Civil Society Organizations, Political Parties and the Education sector. A sample of 1222 members of public who were 53.5% males and 46.5% females was drawn. Qualitative and quantitative methods of data analysis were utilized. Quantitative data were analysed through descriptive statistics using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences. The information was then presented in distribution frequency and percentage tables and figures (bar graphs and pie charts). The qualitative data was analyzed through interpretation of responses of the Key Informants. All information from the analyzed data was presented in themes guided by the research objectives. There are a number of findings from the study. Based on the categorization by the Elections Act 2011, the election crimes and offences are: undue influence, bribery, offences relating to elections, use of force or violence, offences relating to voting, treating, offences by members and staff of the Commission, unjustified use of public resources in campaigns, and unjustified use of national security organs. Based on specific types, there are twenty seven types, the most prevalent ones (with a score of about 10.0% and above) being bribery, voter/ballot fraud, hate speech and fighting. These crimes and offences are committed mainly by political aspirants/candidates, unemployed youth, supporters of politicians, party officials and agents and voters. Factors contributing to election crimes and offences in the study areas include: ethnic animosity, tribalism and clanism; poverty; unemployment among the youth; illiteracy among the electorate; incitement and use of abusive and derogatory statements by politicians; corruption in politics; and drug and substance abuse. Election crimes and offences have serious negative socio-economic and political effects on Kenya's society. The major effects include: loss and injury of human life through physical injury, trauma, sickness and deaths of people; destruction and/or loss of property; violence, disturbed peace, fear and tension among people including voters; ethnic tensions and animosity/hatred/enmity; poor leadership and governance when wrong leaders are elected; interruption of businesses; and forced migration, evictions and/or displacement of populations. There are election crimes and offences control measures which are also generally effective in most of the counties. These key measures include: civic education conducted by IEBC and CSOs; deployment of security personnel and patrols; peace, national unity and anti-election crimes and offences campaigns; enforcement of applicable laws by Judiciary; and IEBC Code of Conduct. The major challenges faced in the control of election crimes and offences in Kenya include: inadequate resources and insufficient networks among security agencies; corruption and lack of integrity in the electoral process; illiteracy and ignorance among the electorate; impunity and selfishness of political leaders; tribalism, nepotism, hatred and hostility; and inadequate cooperation and partisan interests among concerned agencies. The key possible solutions to the challenges are: conducting timely and effective civic education; provision of adequate and quality resources towards the control of election crimes and offences; and instituting stiff penalties for election crimes and offences. The major hindrances to free and fair elections are: entrenched corruption among politicians, tribalism, lack of transparency and accountability among responsible agencies and cash handouts to voters. Possible solutions to the hindrances include: conducting civic education on voters' rights and good leadership; strict maintenance of law and order; stiff penalties on those who violate electoral laws; promotion of patriotism and national unity; and facilitating the electoral body to deliver free and fair to all political parties. Based on the findings of this study, some of the conclusions drawn are that: Kenya's political elections are marred by election crimes and offences; the factors contributing to election crimes and offences in Kenya are social, economic and political in nature; election crimes and offences have serious negative social, economic and political effects on the Kenyan society; there are generally effective control measures to address election crimes and offences in Kenya; and that the control of election crimes and offences in Kenya faces a myriad of challenges. Arising from the above findings and conclusions, the study recommends: IEBC and other relevant stakeholders map election crimes and offences in the country and design elaborate pre-emptive strategies and measures towards preventing and addressing them for instance by deploying adequate security and intelligence personnel to detect, investigate and prevent the election crimes and offences before, during and after elections; IEBC, Civil Society Organizations, security agencies, Mass Media, Human Rights groups, Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and Judiciary be adequately facilitated with the necessary legal instruments, financial, infrastructural and adequate and properly trained human resources for them to be able to effectively address the problem of election crimes and offences in Kenya with IEBC specifically being provided with and installing adequate and properly functioning electronic voter registration, voting and election results transmission equipment; enhancing awareness of politicians, their supporters, party agents, the youth, voters and all others involved in committing election crimes and offences through collaborative civic education and sensitization forums organized and supported by both public and private sector agencies; the IEBC, the Judiciary, the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the National Police Service enforce election and other relevant laws uniformly and punish election offenders irrespective of their roles and status in society; Other key policy recommendations include: all rogue election and other government officials found to perpetrate election crimes and offences be relieved of their duties; the Police to pacify all organized criminal gangs operating in the country by among others, dismantling their organizational and operational structures and disrupting their funding sources and networks; instituting of economic programmes aimed at alleviating poverty and empowering all Kenyans in general and the youth in particular by way of opening up employment and other economic opportunities in the formal and informal sectors of the economy; encouraging and supporting inter-ethnic and clan activities (including exchange programmes) towards addressing the negative effects of ethnic animosity, tribalism and clanism with the National Cohesion and Integration Commission playing a leading role in this aspect; embracing a zero-tolerance policy on corruption by all members of public, state agencies and political parties; the Government to ensure equitable distribution of national resources, political and economic opportunities in all regions to guard against election crimes and offences resulting from the unequal distribution and competition for the same; and measures be put in place by both Government and non-government agencies to ensure that formal education is affordable and accessible to the majority of the citizenry through literacy promotion initiatives and programmes. Details: Nairobi: National Crime Research Centre, 2014. 114p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 1, 2015 at: http://crimeresearch.go.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=4:preliminary-reports&Itemid=496 Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: http://crimeresearch.go.ke/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=4:preliminary-reports&Itemid=496 Shelf Number: 136934 Keywords: Political Offenses |